The Manager Tax
A researcher at Strange Loop Canon ran an AI experiment with 15 tasks and three setups.
- An LLM model working alone.
- A “manager” model that split the work and delegated to AI specialist agents.
- And a market where models bid for the job and the best bid won.
The manager cost four times more than the market and produced worse output.
This manager model is predominant. An account director at the top, splitting the brief across channels (direct mail, email, telemarketing, major gifts) and sending the pieces out for revision. The donor at the other end gets a fragmented, over-frequent experience. You pay quadruple for the orchestration and the orchestration is the problem.
Why does the model break? The manager has to nail two things before anybody else can do anything. Know what the subtasks are. Know what good reassembly looks like. Get either wrong, and individually excellent specialists produce a mess.
Coase, Nobel laureate economist, said firms exist when using a market is too expensive: too much haggling, too much measurement. Hayek, another pro market economist, said the magic of a market is that prices reveal what people actually know. Fundraising got the Coase half. Big integrated agencies and plenty of overhead. It skipped Hayek. There’s no real price signal on what matters. So the sector grades on what’s legible: sends and gross response. Activity becomes the proxy because activity is cheap to count.
That is the volume trap in a sentence, optimizing the legible thing whether it’s helpful or hurtful. Then we wonder why retention keeps drifting south and acquisition has to run harder to fill the bucket.
The fix isn’t a smarter manager, it’s pricing on the right outcome. Pay for net retained value, three years out, not the campaign that closes Friday. Until the price signal is right, you will keep paying four times more for worse work. The AI agents at least have the excuse of being new at this.
Kevin


